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Counter-Terrorism Briefing | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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| The first responsibility of any government
is to provide security for its citizens. Without security from foreign attack
or internal violence there is no foundation on which to build economic and
social institutions. Hence states claim a legitimate monopoly on violence
to compel law and order or repel foreign threats. Dissidents logically claim
that an illegitimate government cannot claim legitimate monopoly on violence
and will assert their right to violent opposition. |
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| The challenge is to develop counter-terrorism strategies that deal effectively with the threat without antagonizing citizens or neighboring states. Most counter-terrorist strategies focus on a military or police perspective and overlook the prospects for diplomacy, negotiation and reform, especially in the early stages of conflict, when possibilities may exist to deflate the pressures at least risk and least cost. Current counter-terrorist strategies draw on experiences from such regions as Northern Ireland, Israel-Palestine, Sri Lanka, and others, where states have developed and tested extensive counter-terrorist campaigns over long periods of time. However, the fact that these campaigns have been relatively unsuccessful in ending protracted conflicts suggests that state counter-terrorist strategies may be flawed. Military forces are organized and trained to fight and win wars. Police are organized and trained to orivide normal police services, maintain public order and deal with rodinary crime. Special police forces, like SWAT teams, and special military elements are often developed to fill the gap created by terrorists. |
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One of the central debates has been whether political violence and terrorism should be viewed as a military or criminal phenomenon. Most insurgents, guerrillas and rebels view themselves as soldiers engaged in a war against state repression and demand to be treated as combatants. However, guerrilla warfare is traditionally associated with agrarian societies and undeveloped regions where rebel forces have room to maneuver, may control territory, and act like a military force. Such opportunities are not available in urban settings. Urban environments pose an entirely different set of circumstances that force insurgents into clandestine operations. A dissident movement is invariably outnumbered and out-gunned by the state security forces. They can’t wear uniforms or parade down city streets, maneuver openly in daylight, mobilize a mass following, or engage state forces in open combat. Hence urban guerrilla warfare lacks many of the characteristics of military operations. In the case of Northern Ireland, a classic study in urban guerrilla warfare and counter-terrorist strategy, the United Kingdom initially dealt with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) as a military engagement – one army versus another. The UK later adopted a different strategy of “criminalization” that denied IRA activists certain rights under international law available to enemy combatants. Currently, the U.S. appears stuck in a similar quandary in its “war on terror” as it attempts to determine the status of prisoners and the proper courts for trial, if any. Typically, a violent political group becomes a terrorist group as soon as its actions claim the lives of civilians, or non-combatants. In some cases, property damage alone prompts a government to label dissidents as terrorists; in other cases violence against security forces or installations is considered terrorism. States, however, dismiss civilian casualties as “collateral damage” and expect the public to accept this as an unfortunate result that can, itself, be blamed on the terrorists. Two high-visibility incidents point out the differences in perspectives. In January 1972, soldiers from the British Parachute Regiment fired into an unarmed crowd of protesters in Derry, Northern Ireland, killing 13 civilians. Subsequent official investigations sought to justify the killings by state forces, while the victim communities viewed the events as an act of terror designed to instill fear and intimidate them into compliance. In February 1996, an IRA bomb devastated London’s financial district, causing over $500 in damage and disrupting England’s financial infrastructure, but caused only one fatality. Despite the minimal collateral damage, and the fact that the IRA had issued a specific advance warning, this was viewed in England and elsewhere as an act of wanton terrorism. To the IRA it was an act of war, designed to raise the cost of continued British oppression and encourage English citizens to support disengagement from Northern Ireland. The point is neither to justify public violence or condemn state violence, but to encourage people to view violence in its fullest context. There are situations where state dictatorial and authoritarian regimes lack legitimacy, and others where legitimate states are beset by purely radical, or criminal elements There are cases where neither the regime or its opposition have any substantial public following. There are situations where violence is justifiable, or defensible, by either citizens or states, and conversely either party can be guilty of unjustified violence and even terrorism. There are also cases where the only solution is civil war, an inevitable and necessary human catastrophe that ultimately sets the stage for reconciliation and advancement. Discussions of counter-terrorism strategies invariably draw on the experiences of states that have dealt with protracted political violence. Many of the tactics developed have proved damaging and counter-productive. Some tactics may work in one situation but not in another. But in a world where terrorism has become such a critical high-profile issue, involving high costs, communal fear and uncertainty, every potential solution must be examined and debated. Some options entail sacrificing civil liberties, or human rights, others involve pre-emptive attacks on sovereign states, and still others involve sate-sanctioned assassinations, interference in the internal affairs of other countries, or imposition of coercive policies. Some tactics that sound plausible are simply impractical. To date, there has been little public discussion and debate - without such dialogue and without citizen involvement; there are endless opportunities for solutions that despite good intentions make the problems worse. “The counter-terrorist policy of the United States stresses three general rules: 1. Make no deals with terrorists and do not submit to
blackmail. Four enduring policy principles guide US counter terrorism strategy: First, make no concessions to terrorists and strike no deals. The US Government will make no concessions to individuals or groups holding official or private US citizens hostage. The United States will use every appropriate resource to gain the safe return of US citizens who are held hostage. At the same time, it is US Government policy to deny hostage takers the benefits of ransom, prisoner releases, policy changes, or other acts of concession. Second, bring terrorists to justice for their crimes. The United States will track down terrorists who attack Americans and their interests, no matter how long it takes. Third, isolate and apply pressure on states that sponsor terrorism to force them to change their behavior. Seven countries have been designated state sponsors of terrorism: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. Fourth, bolster the counter terrorist capabilities of those countries that work with the United States and require assistance. Under the Antiterrorism Assistance program, the United States provides training and related assistance to law-enforcement and security services of selected friendly foreign governments. Courses cover such areas as airport security, bomb detection, hostage rescue, and crisis management. A recent component of the training targets the financial underpinnings of terrorists and criminal money launderers. Counterterrorist training and technical-assistance teams are working with countries to identify vulnerabilities, enhance capacities, and provide targeted assistance to address the problem of terrorist financing.” - Source: Patterns of Global Terrorism – US State Department U.S. counter-terrorism policy is targeted on international terrorist groups. With the exception of small rogue groups or individuals, America has not experienced organized domestic terrorism since the Viet Nam era when the underground Weathermen prompted the FBI to launch its controversial COINTELPRO program to infiltrate domestic groups opposed to the war. Recent passage of The Patriot Act has renewed fears that sweeping powers granted by this law will result in government abuses and curtailment of civil liberties, including freedom of speech, assembly and personal privacy. Other nations have developed far more aggressive internal programs to fight domestic terrorism. The UK has over 30 years of checkered experience countering violence in Northern Ireland. Those efforts have come within the confines and limitations of a Western democratic society and with significant international oversight. Israel has over 50 years experience combating terrorism emanating from within, from the Occupied Territories and from neighboring states. The Israeli approach has been far more aggressive, far less constrained by democratic institutions and often oblivious to international criticism. Other states from Sri Lanka to Turkey, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Colombia and Peru that have few democratic institutions, or modest human rights traditions have pursued full-blown military campaigns in efforts to crush opposition movements. Regardless of the government structure many states adopt similar strategies, while those without legal and judicial constraints are prone to pursue increasingly repressive, even illegal tactics. Following is a listing of counter-terrorism strategies and tactics is far from complete, but attempts to highlight some of the most significant measures that have been employed. Each measure is worthy of close scrutiny and analysis to determine its effectiveness in achieving the desired objectives and conversely, in evaluating the negative ramifications, costs and consequences. Broad Objectives & Basic Tactics Violent Political Groups (VPGs) need money, activists, public support, freedom to maneuver, access to weapons and explosives, secrecy, and publicity. States can institute programs to deny and disrupt each of these VPG lifelines. However each such programs entail other consequences that may provoke community anger and outrage, validate dissident grievances, or encourage support for terrorism as a necessary evil. The organization, skills and training required may be beyond the scope of traditional police or military organizations. Like soldiers that wear camoflage uniforms to blend into natural environments, or snipers seeking to disguise themselves, terrorists work at blending into their setting. As a result, they look like everybody else and can't be identified on sight. In cases where terrorists share visible characteristics there is a temptation for authorities to attempt profiling, which can alienate communities, without focusing on specific individuals. Such measures (listed below) often provoke an unwelcome backlash that deepens discord. Since terrorists are difficult to identify, states seek to develop intelligence on their covert activities. This involves electronic measures such as wiretaps and visual surviellance (SIGINT), as well as programs to infitrate terrorist organizations, or recruit informers (HUMINT). The inherent challenge with SIGINT is to find relevent information amidst the massive amount of material that can be collected. Infiltrating dissident groups is both time-consuming and risky. Recruiting informers is fraught with problems. Informers are often unreliable with questionable motivations. Paid informers are prone to invent information to justify or enhance their incomes. Infitrators, and informers that are discovered can be used as means to disseminate disinformation. Most terrorist groups are well aware of the risks of betrayal and take drastic measures to punish and discourage snitches, touts and traitors. To further frsutrate authorities sophisticated terrorists have abandoned a military-style, top-down, organization and adopt secretive cell organization structures. Individual cells know anything about their counterparts, so if infiltrated, discovered or apprehended little information is revealed. Al-Qaeda has gone a step further. Al-Qaeda operates much like a franchise, providing financial and logistical resources to kindred "franchisees" that develop targets, plans and operations independently. This dispersed and un-coordinated startegy poses extreme challenges to effective penetration and interdiction measures. It also adds an unpredictaability that is less characteristic of groups under the command and direction of a central authority, with known goals, objectives and tactics. Modern terrorism has also evolved. Today's attacks are less frequent, but more deadly. Terrorists previously acted like rebels seeking to engage the enemy. This was followed by an era of kidnappings and plane highjackings. In response states develop elite counter-terrorist forces, specially trained at hostage negotiation and rescue. Like the child's game - paper-scissors-stone - the next stage of evolution was the adoption of bombings as the preferred tactic. Bombs can be produced from common materials, placed and detonated remotely, with relatively low risk to the bombers and little opportunity for counter-terrorist forces to intercept them. Groups like the IRA developed elaborate warning methods, hoping to avoid civilian casualties. On numerous occassions, UK security forces failed to relay, or intentionally ignored the warnings as part of a plan to discredit the attackers. The latest changes in bombing tactics have been the use of suicide bombers, armed with explosive belts and al-Qaeda's use of highjacked airplanes as flying bombs. Modern advances in electronics and communications has opened a wide array of opportunities for novel bomb delivery methods using remote detonation and remote-controlled vehicles. While 9/11 has focused attention on potential uses of weapons of mass destruction sophisticated bombs remain a more plausible threat. Given the devastation possible by picking high-value targets, it's questionable why terrorists would engage in the more sophisticated, complex and costly chemical and biological and radiological waepons. Counter-terrorism experts are challenged to developed effective tactics to counter simple bombs and improvised explosive devices, which require widespread inspection and detection activities to screen travelers, baggage, and commercial shipments. One peculiar habit of most terrorist groups is an inclination to maintain records. Even in the remote caves of Afghanistan, extensive records and documents have been regularly discovered. This suggests that intelligence remains one of the most valuable counter-terror startegies. In cases of domestic insurgency, dissidents tend to come from a host community, or minority group that often lives in somewhat defined areas. This has led some states to attempt containment strategies designed to shrink, or limit, the conflict zone of conflict. They erect barriers to restrict, or deny access. Such measures make movement more difficult, but have never solved the problem On the contrary it has exacerbated the problems by segragating communities and fostering ghettoization, which in turn breeds greater hatreds and more terrorists. The difficulty and frustration associated with countering terrorism, or even finding the terrorists has prompted states to adopt broad measures to drain the pond to catch the fish. The idea is to subvert community support for insurgents by imposing collective punishment on the people on whom terrorist rely for support and assistance. These measures are listed below and represent the extremes to which states will go to fight terrorism - heedless of the consequences. Ironically, the activities that eventually help resolve political conflict are often actions, or reforms that were demanded from the beginning. The cycle of violence is ultimately broken by a cycle of reform. If there is one lesson from human history it is that people will rebel and fight for justice and equality- they always have and always will. If there is a second lesson, it is the age-old maxim that none have ever given up power voluntarily. · States ban opposition political parties Widescale-Based Counter-Attack Measures States may adopt Special Powers Laws, authorizing: · States limit press/media access · States open back-channel (secret) negotiations
with dissidents Despite the myriad counter-terrorism measures available,
those states that have experimented with counter-terrorism have had only
limited success and often runs the risk of alienating significant elements
of the population. .In most situations, terrorism is better classified
as a criminal phenomenom that should be dealt with using police services,
rather than a primarily militaly response. Arguably, the best results
are acheived through cooperation of joint state security forces. Police
forces supported by intelligence assets and backed-up by military elements
as required appear to offer the best chances for containing terrorist
activity. Applications to International Islamist Terrorism Terrorism and counter-terrorist responses typically have been related to nationalist and self-determination movements, where inequities and injustice are rooted in the historical or colonial experience. In certain countries, or regions political violence stems from efforts to change the regime to one that is less authoritarian and that shares the collective wealth more equitably, as in many Latin American countries. One can argue that the current surge of Islamist terrorism stems from the same kind of frustrations and relative deprivation. Virtually all, dissident movements strive to justify their goals by subscribing to a lofty ideology. In many instances dissidents have adopted socialist, communist or Marxist ideologies, as the justification for demands to redistribute wealth and opportunity. Are these deeply held beliefs or convenient ways to explain the goal and purpose of the movement? The frustration of Islamic Fundamentalists (Islamists)
may be no different. Most Muslim states have no positive experience with
democracy, nor with communism or any other secular political formula.
There political experience has been with totalitarian regimes and colonial
emperors. The result has been frustration, relative deprivation and continual
hopelessness. The emergence of a charismatic leaders like the Ayatollah
Khomeini in Iran and Usama bin Laden give voice to some form of change
and some hope for change. Their ideological justification is in the Koran,
and in the distortion of its traditional teachings. Perhaps, the path to peace and prosperity will lie in gradual evolution not revolution. Iran and Afghanistan have experimented with government based on religion. The results have not been encouraging. It may require yet another revolution before they attempt a government that represents the interests of all and that can function effectively in a global economy. One approach to a counter-terrorist policy to deal with Islamist extremists, then, is to view their struggle in terms of its similarities with other violent political conflicts. This will entail identifying paths to the reforms that remove repressive regimes and support the collective aspirations of a frustrated, bitter and angry people. |
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| Related Resources | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
The
Diplomacy of Counterterrorism Special Operations
& Counter-Terrorist Organizations: |
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