Since the end of major combat an Iraqi insurgency has developed, culminating with separate uprisings of Sunnis in Fullujah and Shi’a in the area of Najaf. This may be just the beginning. The POW war crimes scandal has sullied America’s reputation and will certainly inspire recruitment of insurgents bent on driving the US out of Iraq. US election year politics aside it’s time for serious re-evaluation. Should the US stay, or begin a managed withdrawal? If it stays how many soldiers are really needed?

Bush and his surrogates repeat the mantra from their talking points, assuring the public of America’s unwavering resolve to stay the course. “For America to fail would be unthinkable.” As America finds itself lost amid the shifting sands of Iraqi politics and power struggles, there’s one thing we haven’t heard mentioned – the proverbial light at the end of the tunnel.

IS IT TIME TO BEGIN A PHASED U.S. WITHDRAWAL?

Let’s be honest; the US didn’t invade Iraq out of any humanitarian motive. We were warned of the threat of Saddam’s WMDs, but there weren’t any – mission accomplished. We were warned that Saddam was a tyrannical, homicidal maniac, now he’s gone – mission accomplished. We were inspired to liberate the Iraqi people – mission accomplished. We were warned that Iraq was a terrorist threat, which has become a self-fulfilling prophecy. They weren’t a threat before; they certainly are now.

The US has no legal, or moral obligation to rebuild Iraq. The invasion was swift and did relatively little damage. The bridges were left in tact; the oil fields and refineries are as functional, or better than we found them; lights are back on, the water is running and recovery, we’re told is well underway. Mission accomplished.

The only reason to stay is to “impose democracy,” which certainly sounds like a contradiction in terms. We could as easily affirm the right of the Iraqi people to self-determination – mission accomplished. The US could turn over sovereignty and begin a phased withdrawal. We could even encourage the UN to provide some nation-building assistance, and we could write a check to ease our conscience, subject, of course, to Iraq’s good behavior. Why not?

Indeed, to stay on as an occupying force could legitimately require congressional authorization, either direct authorization, or indirectly by approving or withholding funds. The Bush administration would need to make the case for occupation as it did to justify the pre-emptive invasion. They’d have to have a plan, a budget and a schedule with milestones.

The Bush administration didn’t do a very good job anticipating the problems and challenges of securing the peace and building a state, but now they have experience.

WHAT CAN AMERICA EXPECT IF IT REMAINS IN IRAQ?

Well, more casualties, more money spent and more political turmoil - and virtually no help, no appreciation and no easy solutions.

We could also look to the experiences in other conflict zones for guidance. Since America is the center of the known universe there is a tendency to focus solely on the American experience, ignoring those of other nations with far more salient similarities - like Northern Ireland, a land of terrible beauty, home to “The Troubles.”

Northern Ireland is a classic case study of urban, nationalist resistance in a polarized society, dominated by an artificial majority, created by British mapmakers. Certainly, there are many differences between Ireland and Iraq, but a review of the similarities can be especially valuable. Having lived there, I have considerable experience and see some disturbing similarities. The unsavory history of Britain’s first and last colony can shed considerable light on America’s challenges in Iraq, far more so than a re-hash of the Viet Nam War.

Iraqis have lived under a series of dictatorships since British mapmakers created the artificial state after World War II and dominated by an elite subgroup. Iraq now has a nationalist resistance movement(s) and is a society divided by ethnic and religious differences that will be difficult to reconcile. The country is predominately urban, reasonably developed and an ideal venue for urban warfare.

CONTRAST & COMPARISONS

In Ireland, the British got stuck into a situation characterized by long-term inequities between two communities. In Iraq, the US has blissfully inserted itself into a situation where long-term animosities between Kurds, Sunnis and Shiites were masked and repressed by an authoritarian dictatorship.

In Ireland the oppressed minority slowly organized a resistance movement and developed sources of weapons. In Iraq, the native political factions are only starting to organize, but have ready access to weaponry. As a result, Iraqis have mounted a quick but disorganized resistance to US occupation, while political and sectarian divisions have yet to emerge fully. We can be assured that they will.

Although Shia Muslims represent 60% of Iraq’s population, the US was quick to announce that a new coalition government would not be a theocracy. Although the US may dictate the kind of government it wants in Iraq, the Iraqi people will ultimately have their say – with or without US permission. Under Saddam’s regime, the Sunni elite held control of the country’s economic infrastructure and repressed the Shia majority and Kurdish minority, killing untold thousands of dissenters. Such events are not easily forgotten or forgiven. Both Shia and Kurds will demand a real role in any new government and economy, and they’ll want retribution against their former oppressors.

In the North of Iraq, the Kurds have been pliant, but beneath the cooperative face is a deep-seated nationalism dedicated to establishing the state of Kurdistan that was promised at the end of World War I. The Kurds are the world’s largest ethnic group without a country, numbering over 25 million, with 4-5 million living in Iraq and many more in neighboring Turkey and Iran. Despite their persecution under the Hussein regime, they have a well-established political structure, complete with opposing factions, including an extremist fundamentalists organization associated with al-Qaeda.

Even before the Iraq invasion, Turkey threatened to invade Iraq if the Iraqi Kurds were allowed to establish an independent state. Turkey’s position hardly contributes to the notion of democratic self-determination.

The Sunnis and Ba’athists dominated Iraq’s economy. No group ever gives up wealth and power voluntarily. Like Unionists if Northern Ireland, they will fight to hold what they feel is theirs.

Northern Ireland has two religious factions, Catholics and Protestants, and three quasi, or perceived ethnic groups Irish, Scots-Irish and British-Irish. For the sake of brevity, we’ll skip over a more detailed comparison.

THE SECURITY CHALLENGE AND FORCE LEVELS

The US invasion of Iraq included sufficient forces to dominate a depleted and ineffectual Iraqi army, led by a military idiot. Lacking an air force, or viable air defenses, Iraq was a virtual turkey shoot, as US forces charged to Baghdad. A fundamental rule of war is that it’s easier to win a war than to win the peace.

After violence erupted between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, Britain deployed troops to restore security. In July 1972, over 30,000 British soldiers were stationed in the province. Ten years later the force had been reduced to just over 18,000, but supplemented by over 8,000 members of the RUC police force. In 1972, 470 died in the violence and by 1982 the death toll declined to 97.

The population of Northern Ireland is about 1.5 million; hence overall troop levels were about 1 soldier per 50 citizens. More realistically, the ratio was closer to 1:17, since the security forces were aligned primarily against the Catholic population numbering about 500,000. Despite the concentration of forces, violence continued for nearly 30 years. (Another perspective on the conflict is to equate the death toll to an equivalent ratio to America’s population. The death rate in 1972 (470) approximated 1 per 3200 people, comparable to a death toll in America of about 87,500 in one year.)

If these numbers were applied to Iraq (Pop. 25,000,000), equivalent US-Coalition force requirements would range between 500,000 (1:50) and 1.6 million (1:16). The US recently increased its troop strength from 115,000 to 135,000. This an order of magnitude less than British forces deployed in Northern Ireland. Qualitative troop comparisons aside, the US could need an additional 400,000 to 1,000,000 soldiers to provide similar security. The problem is that even with the high British troop strength, Northern Ireland had no security. Instead, it they settled for an acceptable level of violence.

An additional 400,000 troops sounds incredible, but consider this: the British coalition forces accepted responsibility for security in Basra and its environs. Presumably, relying on their experience in Northern Ireland the Brits have deployed about 25,000 troops in an area with a population of about 1,500,000. This is almost exactly the troop strength, population and ratio used in Northern Ireland. The Basra area has not had nearly the degree of insurrection and anarchy that has plagued the rest of the country under US occupation.

In Bosnia the security force levels were 18.6 troops per thousand of population. In Kosovo there were 20.0 troops per thousand. In Basra, Iraq, the British force ratio is currently 20.0 per thousand.

Stated differently, the ratio in Bosnia was 1:54, (1 soldier for 54 people), in Kosovo about 1:50 and currently in Basra, Iraq. 1:60.

However, US coalition forces in Iraq have a ratio of about 5.3 per thousand of population, or 1:180 (one soldier for every 180 people).

To put these numbers in perspective, the United States, on average, has about 2.3 (police officers) to 3.1 (all law enforcement personnel) per thousand of population. Security force levels in Iraq are only about double those in the US, while force levels in Bosnia and Kosovo were about seven times higher.

THE POLITICAL CHALLENGE

Britain didn’t invade Northern Ireland and didn’t need to fight their way onto Irish shores. Even Catholics welcomed British troops in the hope they would quell the violence. Catholics served tea to the soldiers and welcomed them into their homes – the kind of greeting some expected for American forces entering Iraq. But even though British troops were welcomed, the honeymoon quickly deteriorated as the British were manipulated into choosing sides and were eventually forced to suspend the Northern Ireland government and impose direct rule.

Over the next 30 years, Britain attempted unsuccessfully to find a way to restore government to the province. Efforts to bridge the communal and sectarian divide were undermined and thwarted by intractable factions.

Iraq is different. The US led a military coalition to drive the Iraqi army from Kuwait in 1991, and then maintained a no-fly zone over Iraq for 12 years. During this period US planes regularly attacked Iraqi forces from the air, while the UN maintained economic sanctions to prevent Saddam Hussein from rebuilding his military. The economic sanctions took a toll on the Iraqi people. Humanitarian organizations have estimated that as many as 500,000 Iraqis died as a result of the sanctions and the Hussein regime exploited very opportunity to blame the US for Iraq’s adversity.

When the US invaded, American air forces proudly unveiled their “shock and awe” campaign, designed to frighten and terrorize the Iraqi people. It’s little wonder that US forces didn’t march into Baghdad on a carpet of rose petals.

Nonetheless, the Americans set about convening a new Iraqi government. What took the British 30 years would be done in one year. Presumably, the plan was to establish a government before the Iraqis could break into political factions. The US shipped 700 Iraqi exiles to Iraq to form the core of a new government, people who left Iraq in the 1950’s.

The US coalition disbanded the Iraqi army and purged Sunni Ba’athists from leadership positions. Such actions were certain to alienate Sunnis and resulted in the Fullujah uprising. Recognizing this error, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) negotiated a deal to put a former Iraqi general in charge of a Sunni militia, thus creating a first paramilitary force.

At almost the same time, arrest warrants were issued for Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr on murder conspiracy charges. Al-Sadr’s militia closed ranks to protect him and took control of Najaf and Karbala. Media reporting suggests that al-Sadr is the only person in Iraq wanted for a crime. Shiites see the same kind of double standards that existed under Saddam Hussein. Sunni radicals kill and dismember US contractors and end up with a armed paramilitary force, while the murder of a Shia cleric provokes the US to demand that al-Sadr be arrested or killed and his militia destroyed. Al-Sadr needs to call O.J. Simpson, Michael Jackson, or Scott Peterson for a legal referral.

The point is this: the fractionalization of Iraq has only just begun. As factions emerge and organize dissension and fighting will escalate. The US coalition forces will remain a lightening rod for political violence that ultimately, can only be resolved by the Iraqi people. If the US chooses to remain engaged and accept responsibility for Iraq’s internal security many more US troops will be needed and for a prolonged period – 10, 20 even 30 years. With US forces already over-extended, out-numbered and under severe pressure there is only one way to “support our troops” – the draft.